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ABSTRACT
In this essay, I bring together Participatory
Design's (PD) tradition of critical reflection on
one's own practices, and Science and Technology
Studies' focus on specific activities ('opening the
black box'), in order to explore the ethics of PD.
Three different forms of ethics—ethics-of-theother, pragmatist ethics and virtue ethics—are
discussed and several examples from practice are
provided to argue that PD is 'filled with ethics': PD
participants always find themselves in ethical
situations and engage with ethics—even if they are
unaware of these ethics or if these ethics remain
implicit. It is proposed that reflexivity provides
ways for PD practitioners to cope more explicitly
and mindfully with these ethics.
UPON OPENING THE BLACK BOX
In his influential article, ‘Upon opening the black box
and finding it empty’, Winner (1993) expressed
discontent with the many studies in the field of science
and technology studies (STS) that discuss technology
without addressing moral questions. He appreciated that
STS-ers (‘social-constructivists’), with their empirical
and detailed studies of the ways in which people
practically develop and apply technology, ‘opened the
black box [of the development and application of
technologies] and showed a colorful array of social
actors, processes and images therein’, but criticized
their approach because ‘the box they reveal is still a
remarkably hollow one’. Many STS scholars neglect,
ignore or steer away from ethical questions.
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In this essay, I will respond to Winner’s plea to pay
more attention to ethics. I will attempt to bring together
the critical reflection that has always been a part of the
tradition of participatory design (PD) (Bjerknes, Ehn,
and Kyng 1989; Ehn 1990; Greenbaum and Kyng 1991;
Kyng and Mathiassen 1997; Schuler and Namioka
1993), and the study of people’s concrete practices that
has been the main method within STS (Latour and
Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987; Pinch and Bijker 1987;
Woolgar 1991b; Bijker and Law 1992; Knorr Cetina
1995; Rip 2000; Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003). By
combining critical reflection and a focus on concrete
practices, I will explore the ethical qualities of PD
practices and argue that PD practices are always ‘filled
with ethics’. I will argue that ‘to find oneself in ethical
situations and to engage with ethics’ is always part of
PD practitioners’ job descriptions—even if they are
unaware of these ethics or if these ethics remain
implicit.
This focus on ethics is in line with Bjerknes and
Bratteteig’s (1995) observation that the focus of PD has
shifted from politics towards ethics. Based on a review
of (typical, Scandinavian) PD projects, they argue that
‘All the projects in the 70’s had an explicit political bias
in wanting to change the preconditions for system
development … The political system developer is an
emancipator, carrying out an action programme to give
the weak parties knowledge they can use to increase
their power.’ And ‘From the middle 80’s, the quest for
democracy was left to the individual system developer’,
whose responsibility ‘changed towards being a
facilitator of a morally … ‘correct’ system development
process … The ethical system developer is mainly
responsible towards their own individual ethical codex
… promoting workplace democracy through
engagement in system development situations.’
It is this kind of ethics1 that I will be concerned with: a
kind of ethics that focuses on the micro scale of PD
1

I associate ethics with the ways in which people experience freedom
and responsibility in smaller groups, e.g. in face-to-face interactions,
whereas I associate politics with the ways in which power and agency
are organized in larger contexts, e.g. in organizations or societies. In
other words: ethics always occur within a context of politics. As a
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participants, their ways of interacting and cooperating
with each other, their ways of organizing research and
design processes, and their thoughts and feelings.
Moreover, in my exploration below, I will focus on
specific and social practices. This focus follows from
the character of PD practices, which are always specific,
in that they are concerned with developing specific
problems for specific problems, rather than with general
solutions for general problems, and always social, in
that communication and cooperation between people are
at the heart of PD. This is in line with Van de Poel and
Verbeek’s (2006) proposal to ‘perform a contextsensitive form of ethics’, i.e. to focus on people’s
specific practices within a project, rather than evaluating
the ethical consequences of the outcomes of their
project—as is often done in studies of ethics of design.

A TURN TO ETHICS
There is a growing interest in the relation between
ethics and design, at least since Papanek’s (1991) appeal
to designers to turn their attention to real problems and
real needs. More recently, it has been argued—e.g.
under the label of value sensitive design—that designers
attempt to embed specific values in the products that
they develop, and that this embedding process should be
made more transparent, so that people can more
consciously participate in this process (Friedman and
Kahn 2002; Albrechtslund 2007; Van de Poel 2009;
Manders-Huits 2010). This line of thought is similar to
notions from STS concerning designers’ attempts to
create scripts (Akrich 1995; 1992), i.e. to make
prescriptions that designers put into their products in
order to influence people’s behaviour, and to configure
users (Woolgar 1991a; Mackay et al. 2000), i.e. to make
descriptions of users in order to define and fix users, so
that they can be designed for. Designers envision new
products as well as what people can do—or should do—
with these products, which can be considered as a
material form of articulating prescriptive ethics.
Another way of drawing parallels between design and
ethics was put forward by Whitbeck (1998), who
proposed to treat ethical problems not as rational
decision problems—as well-defined problems that have
a number of well-defined solutions from which one
selects the best option, based on rules or reasoning, as
so-called ‘rational foundationalist’ approaches would
have it—but, instead, to treat ethical problems as illstructured problems that need to be dealt with like how
designers deal with such problems. Similarly, Lloyd
(2006) noted that design thinking and ethical thinking
are both are concerned with envisioning and developing
consequence, the ‘black box’ that I attempt to open (the ethics of PD)
is significantly smaller than Winner’s ‘black boxes’, which often
contained both political and ethical aspects—see, e.g. Winner’s (1988)
accounts of the ways in which technical systems influence people’s
agency, with the example of city planners that built low-hanging
viaducts in New York City in order to prevent coloured people, who
could not afford cars and had to use busses, to reach Jones Beach.
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possibilities and with evaluating and choosing between
possibilities.
Below, I will organize my argument around the notion
of design thinking, i.e. the idea that design is concerned
both with exploring and articulating problems and with
exploring and developing possible solutions and that
these processes are intimately intertwined: the ‘design
process involves finding as well as solving problems’
(Lawson 2006, p. 125) and the ‘problem and solution
co-evolve’ (Cross 2006, p. 80). Furthermore, I would
like to distinguish between two elements of design
thinking: 1) generating ideas and developing
knowledge, e.g. when studying the problem or
articulating a problem definition; and 2) making
decisions and creating things, e.g. when developing and
trying-out possible solutions. Moreover, I propose that,
in order to understand the ethics of PD, we need to
understand the ethics of the processes in which PD
participants generate ideas and develop knowledge and
the ethics of the processes in which they make decisions
and create things.
In Western culture, there are two mainstream schools of
ethics: deontological ethics, which are based on an
understanding of one’s duties and which focus on
applying universal, moral rules, typically by reasoning
logically; and consequentialist ethics, which are based
on evaluating the positive and negative consequences of
one’s choices and which aim to maximize the positive
consequences. Rather than drawing from these two
schools, I chose to draw from three relatively less wellknown forms of ethics: ethics-of-the-other, pragmatist
ethics and virtue ethics. The main reason for this choice
is that these three are typically concerned with specifics,
with concrete, practical and social practices (similar to
PD which is concerned with specifics, with concrete,
practical and social practices), whereas, deontological or
consequentialist ethics typically tend to be concerned
with universal duties or with abstract rules.

ETHICS-OF-THE-OTHER

With ethics-of-the-other, I refer to forms of ethics that
take the other and the relationships between other and
self, as a starting point. Philosophers Emmanuel
Levinas (1906-1995) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004)
are proponents of such ethics. Levinas wrote extensively
about the encounter between other and self, and Derrida
about différance and otherness. In their ethics one
always finds oneself within other-self relations, i.e.
within ethical relations.
In a PD project, different people meet and attempt to
communicate and cooperate—which Levinas and
Derrida would conceive of as encounters between other
and self and as ethical situations. In my doctoral
dissertation (Steen 2008), I studied two PD projects and,
using concepts from Levinas and Derrida, reflected
critically on our own practices in these practices. Below,
I will discuss two key findings.
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First, in our projects, we attempted to gather knowledge,
e.g. about users and their needs and preferences, and we
approached these users, e.g. in workshops and
interviews, and in these encounters we tended to reduce
what we saw and heard from them to concepts that we
were already familiar with—‘The foreign being …
becomes a theme and an object. … It falls into the
network of a priori ideas, which I bring to bear, as to
capture it’—which led to ‘the reduction of the other to
the same’ (Levinas 1987, pp. 48-50). Levinas
characterized this tendency as the making of a grasping
gesture, by which one pulls the other into one’s own
way of thinking, which makes it very difficult to learn
anything new. He described the self, as a ‘melting pot
where every Other is transmuted into the Same’
(Levinas 1996, p. 13). In an attempt to gather
knowledge, the self grasps the other and draws the other
into its own ‘melting pot’.
PD practitioners cannot escape this tendency. Their
interests and ambitions, their knowledge and ideas—
their selves—get in the way of their attempts to be open
towards others, towards users and co-workers.
In one project, we conducted a series of four co-design
workshops with different groups of police officers.
Based on the findings from each workshop, we
gradually changed our project’s focus and developed a
mobile telecom application that promotes cooperation
between police officers. Such a way of adapting the
project, based on interactions with users, is considered
good practice in PD. However, we also missed several
opportunities to learn from police officers and to let
their ideas affect the project. E.g. in the first workshop,
we jointly articulated four topics that they (police
officers) experienced as problematic. But after the
workshop, we (project-team members) chose to focus
on one topic that was comfortably close to our own
ambition to develop a telecom application—and ignored
other topics that were relevant for the police officers.
This example illustrates a key question of PD: How to
balance users’ concerns with project-team members’
ambitions? Or, drawing from Levinas: How can PD
practitioners balance their ambition to be open towards
the other with their tendency to grasp the other, to
privilege the self over the other? We can turn to Levinas
for a suggestion to attempt to counter this tendency. He
envisioned an attempt to escape the gesture of grasping
via a form of desire that is not aimed at satisfying the
self, but is respectful of the otherness of the other: ‘This
desire without satisfaction hence takes cognizance of
the alterity of the other’ (1987, p. 56).
Second, in our projects, we did not only need to move
towards openness (divergence), we also needed to move
towards closure (convergence); we needed to draw
conclusions and deliver results, and this involves the
making of decisions. Derrida remarked that one cannot
make a genuine decision by merely applying knowledge
or simply following rules: ‘It is when it is not possible
to know what must be done, when knowledge is not and
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cannot be determining that a decision is possible as
such. Otherwise, the decision is an application: one
knows what has to be done, it’s clear, there is no more
decision possible; what one has here is an effect, an
application, a programming’ (1995, p. 147-8). Derrida
noted that people often attempt to program invention
and that this can lead to ‘the invention of the same’
(1989, pp. 46-55); one tends to stay within one’s own
comfort zone, which makes it hard to get out-of-thebox, to be open to otherness and to create anything new.
PD practitioners bring their skills and methods, their
knowledge and ideas, and these enable them to move
towards closure. Moreover, their tendency to move
towards closure and to program invention is often
stronger than their attempt to move towards openness
and to be open to otherness.
In the other project, we cooperated with informal
carers—more specifically, with people who provide
‘primary’ informal care for people who suffer from
dementia and who live at home, often their husband or
wife. In this project, some project-team members,
working within a psychology tradition, conducted a
questionnaire-based survey in order to obtain a
statistically sound overview of the needs of people with
dementia and of their ‘primary’ informal carers. In
parallel, other project-team members, working within a
co-design tradition, conducted informal interviews in
order to inform and inspire their creative process.
Both approaches are attempts to combine moves
towards openness, i.e. to learn from potential users, and
towards closure, i.e. to draw conclusions about users’
needs and to create products for them. However, our
methods enabled us to program innovation; we moved
more easily towards closure than towards openness. The
people who conducted the survey used questionnaires
and had to make the respondents’ diverse and rich
utterances fit into the questionnaire’s fixed and narrow
categories, and the people who conducted the co-design
interviews started with ideas to create a telecom
application and probably had these ideas in mind during
the interviews and privileged their own ideas over users’
ideas. We can turn to Derrida for a suggestion to better
balance openness and closure. He advocated welcoming
the other: ‘To invent would then be to “know” how to
say “come” and to answer the “come” of the other’
(1989, p. 56); this would be an active form of passivity
because it requires an effort to not make the other into a
theme within one’s own program.

PRAGMATIST ETHICS
Philosophical pragmatism emerged in the USA in the
late 19th century, with key figures such as William
James, C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. Pragmatists focus
on people’s practices (rather than on theories) and
opposes all kinds of a priori assumptions or fixed ideas,
e.g. concerning (false) dichotomies such as objectsubject, fact-value or individual-society. Below, I will
focus on texts by Dewey (1859-1952).
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There is a growing interest in Dewey’s ideas (Hickman
1998b; 2010; Hildebrand 2008), e.g. in relation to
technology, engineering and design (Hickman 1990;
2001; Emison 2004; 2006; Melles 2008; Dalsgaard
2009). Key concepts in Dewey’s pragmatism are
experience, knowledge, change, communication and
cooperation—which converge in his ideas on inquiry
(Hickman 1998a; Steen 2009; Steen en Dhondt 2010).
A key theme in Dewey’s work was his concern for
creating productive relationships between practices and
theories, and his advocacy for an ‘empirical method’ of
moving back and forth between practices (‘primary
experiences’) and reflections (‘secondary experiences’)
(Dewey 1965, p. 36). He argued that knowledge is
always provisional (‘particular’ and ‘contingent’, not
‘universal’ and ‘necessary’ (Dewey 1920, p. 78) and
that one should continuously reconstruct knowledge
based on experiences. Another key theme is his
meliorism: ‘the belief that the specific conditions which
exist at one moment, be they comparatively bad or
comparatively good, in any event may be bettered’
(Dewey 1920, p. 178). He advocated communication
and cooperation and positive change. More specifically,
he advocated organizing processes of joint inquiry in
which people jointly explore problems and develop
solutions—which sounds similar to organizing PD.
It is important to note that Dewey always put moral
experience and moral questions at the centre of his
philosophy. When people act and experience, when they
communicate and cooperate, they engages in ethics;
acting, experiencing, communication and cooperation
always have ethical qualities (Hildebrand 2008, pp. 6393; Papas 1998). The ethics of PD occur when the
people involved in such joint inquiry engage in
reflection, deliberation, evaluation, communication,
cooperation, choice and action.
Dewey envisioned inquiry as a process that fuses
careful, reflective thinking and careful, practical
experimentation, starting from a situation of perplexity
(‘an indeterminate situation’) and moving towards some
sort of resolution (‘a unified whole’) (1938, pp. 104-5).
He conceptualized the process of inquiry as consisting
of five phases (pp. 101-119)—which do not have to
happen in that order but can be organized as an iterative
process. Below, I will briefly outline phases 1 and 2
(problem exploration and definition), phase 3
(combining perception and conception) and phases 4
and 5 (trying out and evaluating possible solutions), and
discuss the ethics of PD.
1. ‘The indeterminate situation’: A specific situation is
experienced as problematic, without yet knowing what
is precisely problematic about it, so that this situation
becomes ‘questionable’.
2. ‘Institution of a problem’: A provisional problem
definition is formulated. It is important to be aware of
the specific wording of the problem: ‘The way in which
the problem is conceived decides what specific

Nordic Design Research Conference 2011, Helsinki www.nordes.org

suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed;
what data are selected and which rejected’.
Dewey stressed that active and creative engagement
with personal experiences and emotions, and sharing
these experiences and emotions, is critical: ‘inquiry is
not a purely logical process—feeling is a useful and
orienting presence throughout each phase’ (Hildebrand
2008, p. 57). E.g. story telling can be applied to express
and discuss experiences. Please note that this approach
is rather different from a ‘scientific’ approach to
inquiry, in which people (supposedly) find ‘facts’.
The ethics of PD occur in the ways in which PD
participants express and share personal experiences and
are able to empathise with each other. Ideally, there is
room within a PD project for the expression and sharing
of such experiences, so that these can indeed become
starting points for inquiry.
3. ‘The determination of a problem-solution’: In an
iterative process, the problematic situation and possible
solutions are simultaneously explored and developed:
‘Observations of facts and suggested meanings or ideas
arise and develop in correspondence with each other’—
which is, again, very similar to design thinking.
Dewey suggested that problems are best explored and
defined using perception, i.e. one’s capacities to see,
hear, touch, smell and taste (what is there), and that
solutions are best explored and developed using
conception, i.e. one’s capacities to imagine new
situations (what could be there). Ideally, perceiving the
problematic situation and conceiving possible solutions
are productively combined. Different ways or more
precise ways to perceive the problematic situation help
to develop different or more concrete solutions, just like
the conceptualization of different or more detailed
solutions help to perceive the situation differently or
more precisely. Promoting such perception and
conception can require ‘moral imagination’ or ‘dramatic
rehearsal’ (Fesmire 2003; Keulartz et al. 2004), which
are both directly associated to moral experiences and
moral questions.
Similarly, we can create room in PD to imagine and
rehearse what the problematic situation feels like and
what different alternative solutions feel like—by
creating room for perception and conception, e.g. by
engaging with visuals that relate to the problem and the
people involved, or by providing tools that promote
joint creativity (Sanders 2000; Sleeswijk Visser 2009),
4. ‘Reasoning’: Relations between the problem-as-it-iscurrently-defined and different suggestions-forsolutions are studied, e.g. by reasoning about how one
of the solutions can help to solve the problem.
5. ‘The operational character of facts-meanings’: One
tries-out practically how suggested solutions help to
solve the problem, e.g. by conducting experiments.
In the context of PD, these phases are concerned with,
e.g. creating and evaluating prototypes in practical
4

settings or organizing trials in which people try-out the
products or services that are being developed.
Moreover, because things become ‘real’, it is critical
that the people involved cooperate productively in order
to ‘get things done’. Participants need to express their
different—and sometimes conflicting—roles and
interests, so that they can negotiate and can develop
ways of working to practically cooperate.

It is important to stress that this mean has nothing to do
with mediocrity, but is related to excellence (aretè), i.e.
with doing well what a virtuous person would do in this
specific situation—doing well what one is good at, what
one is dispositioned to do. Virtue ethics is not concerned
with countering desire, but with developing and
cultivating well-formed types of desires (MacIntyre
2007, p. 160; Van Tongeren 2003, p. 104).

The ethics of PD occur within these negotiations, in the
ways in which participants deal with their own and with
other participants’ roles and interests, and in the ways in
which they are able to cooperate productively and to
learn from each other.

If we turn to PD, we can discuss the two components of
design thinking introduced above—generating ideas and
developing knowledge and making decisions and
creating things—and relate them to the virtues of
curiosity (a desire to learn) and creativity (a desire to
create), respectively (which are also mentioned at
http://www.virtuescience.com/virtuelist.html). Other
relevant virtues for PD would be virtues that are related
to communication, cooperation, participation and
emancipation—but these will not be discussed here.

VIRTUE ETHICS
Virtue ethics emphasizes a person’s character, choices
and actions, i.e. what he or she does and why and how
he or she does that (rather than emphasizing duties, as in
deontological ethics, or actions’ consequences, as in
consequentialist ethics). Virtue ethics is concerned with
developing and practising virtues that enable one to
flourish, i.e. to live a fulfilled and happy life
(eudaimonia) in a just society (dikaiosunè). This school
of ethics goes back to Aristotle—hence the Greek.
Virtue ethics implies a teleology, i.e. with ideas about
what people are dispositioned to do, about their goal
(telos). A knife is a virtuous knife if it does well what a
knife is supposed to do, i.e. if it cuts things well.
Likewise, a person is a virtuous person if he or she does
well what a person is dispositioned to do: to flourish.
Alisdair MacIntyre, a virtue ethics advocate, defined
virtues as ‘dispositions not only to act in particular
ways, but also to feel in particular ways. To act
virtuously … is to act from inclination formed by the
cultivation of virtues’ (2007, p. 149). A virtue is like a
disposition and is based on previous choices and is
aimed at choosing the appropriate mean or middle,
which is always relative and dependent upon specific
circumstances (Van Tongeren 2003, p. 57). This mean
is often illustrated with the example of courage, which
is an appropriate mean between cowardice and
recklessness. If you see a man beating up another man
in the street, it would be cowardice to do nothing. But it
would be reckless to boldly interfere. Unless you are a
trained fighter and can handle this situation—then this
would be courageous. For most people, however, it
would be courageous to do something in the middle, e.g.
to attract the attention of others and to call 112.
Finding and choosing this mean ‘demand judgment and
the exercise of the virtues requires therefore a capacity
to judge and to do the right thing in the right place at the
right time in the right way. The exercise of such
judgment is not a routinizable application of rules’
(MacIntyre 2007, p. 150). One can find this mean, for a
specific situation, by using practical wisdom (phronèsis)
(op. cit., p. 154).
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Finding an appropriate mean for curiosity and curiosity
could involve considerations like this: If I had too much
curiosity, I would e.g. approach a person in an interview
merely as a means to satisfy my curiosity, without
respect for him or her as a person. But if I had too little
curiosity, I would, e.g. approach the other indifferently,
and experience the interview as boring. Likewise, if I
had too much creativity, I would, e.g. become
preoccupied with my own ideas and ignore other
people’s contributions. But if I had too little creativity, I
would, e.g. halt the creative process by making
inappropriate objections.
A virtue ethics analysis of a specific situation could
result in a characterization of a virtuous person and of
his or her dispositions and actions in a specific situation
(Harris 2008). This characterization can be related to
MacIntyre’s concept of narrative, with which he draws
attention to ‘the telos of a whole human life, conceived
as a unity’ (2007, p. 202). MacIntyre was critical about
conceptualizations that focus on isolated behaviours,
and instead argued that we should think of ‘a self whose
unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth
to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end’
(op. cit., p. 205).
Virtues can be cultivated, e.g. by becoming aware of
and questioning one’s own practices: Which practice am
I participating in? What is my role in it? What would be
appropriate, in this situation? And how can I move
towards a more appropriate practice? Let me give two
examples (Steen 2008, pp. 194-5) of becoming aware of
my own practice or narrative, of stepping out of my
role, and attempting to act more in line with my telos.
Once I was hosting a workshop with older people, in
which we discussed all sorts of issues related to mobile
telephony. The conversation moved towards ringtones
and how young people can spend too much money on
these. Then one man remarked: ‘But that’s fine with you
[addressing me]; you [possibly also referring to the
telecom operator that commissioned the project] want to
sell as much as possible’ (paraphrased). I empathised
5

with the man and his concerns. I stepped out of my role
and talked about my own unease with working for a
client that seems to have different ideas from mine.
The other example is from in a workshop with call
centre employees, in which we aimed to generate ideas
for new applications for some novel technology. At the
start of the workshop, I did not yet disclose this
technology, assuming that this would help to generate
creative ideas more freely. However, after 30 minutes,
one participant said he found this unfair: ‘I feel as if you
manipulate and use me. Why didn’t you just put your
cards on the table?’ (paraphrased). I empathised with
him and with his appeal to work more transparently, and
stepped out of my role and discussed the workshop
agenda with him and the other participants.
In the first example, I tried to find an appropriate kind
of curiosity, trying to treat the workshop participants not
as means to satisfy my curiosity, but trying to take their,
and my own, curiosity seriously. In the other example, I
similarly tried to find an appropriate kind of creativity,
trying to treat the workshop participants not as material
for my creative process, but trying to take their, and my
own, creativity seriously. In both examples, my practice
was questioned, in the here-and-now, which opened-up
room for reflexivity (see below).

CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that PD practices always have ethical
qualities: PD is based on encounters between people,
which, according to ethics-of-the-other are ethical
encounters; PD is a process of articulating a problem
and developing solutions, which, according to
pragmatist ethics, is an ethical process; and PD
participants’ attitudes, choices and actions are critical to
PD, which, according to virtue ethics, involves ethical
questions about one’s character. These conclusions are
summarized in Table 1, in relation to two elements of
design thinking: 1) generating ideas and developing
knowledge (a perceptive, curious, inward motion); and
2) making decisions and creating things (a conceptive,
creative, outward motion).
Table 1. Different forms of ethics in relation to design thinking, and
the ethical qualities of participatory design (PD).

Ethics-ofthe-other
—
encounter
Pragmatist
ethic—
process s
Virtue
ethics—
character

Generating ideas and
developing
knowledge
Tendency to grasp
the other. Attempt to
welcome the other
(desire)
Joint inquiry, with
perception, sharing of
experiences and
empathy
Cultivate an
appropriate form of
curiosity (mean or
middle)

Making decisions and
creating things
Tendency to program
invention. Attempt to
welcome otherness
(passivity)
Joint inquiry, with
conception,
cooperation and
learning
Cultivate an
appropriate form of
creativity (mean or
middle)
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Ethics-of-the-other can help PD practitioners to reflect
on the encounters with others, e.g. with potential users
of the products or services that we design. This occurs
on the scale of face-to-face meetings, e.g. in workshop
or interviews. Levinas and Derrida conceptualized
encounters between other and self as ethical encounters.
Moreover, they drew attention to our tendency to grasp
the other (rather than being open towards the other), and
to program invention (rather than being open towards
otherness and letting things happen). Their philosophies
also suggest ways to counter these tendencies by
attempting to welcome the other and otherness. This
may help us to organize workshops or interviews
differently, e.g. with a more open mindset.
Pragmatist ethics can help to reflect on the processes in
which PD participants define the problem and develop
solutions. This occurs on a project management scale,
e.g. over the course of several project meetings.
Dewey’s ideas about organizing processes of joint
inquiry can help to bring the ethics of PD to the fore:
when participants express and share their personal
experiences; when they perceive the problem and
conceive possible solutions; and when they negotiate
their different roles and interests. Reflecting on these
processes can help to organize PD differently, e.g. more
towards perception, sharing of experiences and
empathy, and conception, cooperation and learning.
Virtue ethics can help PD practitioners to reflect on
their own practices and to cultivate and practise virtues
that are relevant for PD. This happens within a person,
e.g. within the ways in which he or she thinks, feels,
makes choices and acts. Virtues that are relevant for PD
are, e.g. curiosity and creativity, and also virtues that are
related to communication, cooperation, participation
and emancipation. Virtues can be cultivated by
attempting to find an appropriate mean for each virtue,
dependent on each specific situation, and to concretely
practise that mean.
These three forms of ethics—although they are very
different—share some similarities: they are concerned
with specifics, with concrete, practical and social
practices (rather than with universals or general rules)
they are based not only on reasoning but also on
personal experiences and feelings, such as empathy; and
they are likely to destabilize current practices because
they tend to question rules and assumptions.

REFLEXIVITY
Arguing that PD has ethical qualities is one thing.
Taking these ethics into account when organizing, PD is
another. This begs a number of questions: Why would
PD practitioners want to or need to take these ethics into
account? And, if they want to or need to, how can they
take these ethics into account, practically?
If the reader is convinced that PD has ethical qualities,
then a logical next step is to follow the tradition of PD,
which has always embraced critical reflection on one’s
own practices (Markussen 1994; Gulliksen, Lantz and
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Boivie 1999; Beck 2002) and advocated finding ways to
improve PD, e.g. by further developing and improving
PD (Bertelsen et al. 2005). We need to examine our PD
practices and become more aware of the ethics that are
at play in our PD practices, and find ways to take these
ethics into account. Because—to paraphrase Socrates—
a PD practice unexamined is not worth being practised.
The assumption is that becoming more aware of these
ethics can help to more mindfully cope with them. One
way in which PD practitioners can become more aware
of the ethics is by engaging with reflexivity, i.e.
becoming more aware of what is happening here-andnow and of one’s own involvement, roles and agency in
what is happening. Moreover, the three forms of ethics
discussed above offer different perspectives to become
reflexively aware of the ethics involved: ethics-of-theother draw attention to what happens in face-to-face
meetings; pragmatist ethics draw attention to the overall
process and project management; and virtue ethics draw
attention to one’s own character, choices and actions.
It would be strange to articulate a recommendation like
‘Be reflexive!’ because that would be an example of
‘paradoxical communication’ (a term of communication
theorist Paul Watzlawick), an example of a mismatch
between the message’s content and its form. Simply
demanding that a person is reflexive will not make that
person reflexive. Rather, my proposal for promoting
reflexivity would be to promote questioning. This
proposal is similar to Rhodes’ (2009) proposal for an
‘ethical response to reflexivity … that asks questions
rather than provides answers; that refuses the hubris of
generalizations; that provokes thinking rather than
provides answers; that generates possibilities rather than
prescriptions; that seeks openness rather than closure’.
Posing questions would be a way to promote reflexivity
and would open ways to critically reflect upon and
improve PD practices. Examples of such questions are
the following: What is happening here and now? What
do I think? What do I feel? What do others do, think,
feel? What could we do differently? (general questions);
Am I open to the other? Am I open to otherness?
(ethics-of-the-other); How do we perceive the problem?
How do we conceive solutions? (pragmatist ethics); and
How curious am I (mean)? How creative am I (mean)?
(virtue ethics). In order to promote practical application,
these questions can be printed on a card, so these
questions can function as reminders—see Figure 1.
In closing, let met explore some ideas to also take these
ethics into account in education and in research. Many
engineering and design courses include classes or
workshops about ethics. However, education often
focuses on the results of a project and on evaluating
these results normatively (e.g. in terms of ‘good’ versus
‘bad’, ‘what one should or should not do’). This is
different from the perspective on ethics explored above,
which focuses on the process, and on taking ethical
qualities as a starting point for reflexivity, with as little
a priori normative positioning as possible.
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Ethics / Reflexivity Reminder Card

What is happening here and now?
What do I think? What do I feel?
What do others do, think and feel?
What could we do differently?

Am I open to the other? (desire)
Am I open to otherness? (passive)
How do we perceive the problem?
How do we conceive solutions?
How curious am I now (mean)?
How creative am I now (mean)?

Figure 1: Ethics / Reflexivity Reminder Card

In a similar advocacy for more attention for ethics in
education, Bucciarelli (2007) argued that students must
be able ‘to learn about the social, the organizational—
even the political—complexities of practice’ and that ‘a
major renovation of engineering education is required—
one that goes beyond adding an ethics course to the
curriculum.’ Lloyd and Van de Poel (2008) provide an
example of a design game in which students can engage
in practical, ethical decision making. They developed a
design game in which students can engage in roleplaying, which enables them to (practically) ‘feel’
ethical concepts and decision making—in addition to
training them to (theoretically) ‘know’ ethical concepts
and decision making.
The matters explored above are relatively new, so it will
not come as a surprise that ‘more research is needed’. In
particular, I can imagine research that sets out to
evaluate the ways in which more awareness of the
ethical qualities of PD and reflexivity help to reflect
critically on PD and to improve PD. I speculate that
there are benefits, but cannot articulate them yet.
Furthermore, I can imagine research in which PD
practitioners and scholarly researchers cooperate
constructively—the former providing ‘data’, the latter
providing ‘concepts’—(Beech et al. 2010) or research in
which students participate, e.g. by making explicit the
ethics they find themselves in during design exercises or
student workshops.
The overall goal of making these ethics in PD explicit
and of becoming more aware of these ethics and of
one’s own role in how these ethics are coped with,
would be to reinvent and update PD and to revitalize the
values that PD embodies, in order to make PD relevant
and vibrant in our current times.
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